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Abstract 
Xepapadeas [ 10] develops a pollution abatement incentive mechanism that both reduces the 
information requirements of regulator and is "budget balancing". drawing only on the social gains 
from pollution abatement to encourage firm compliance. This paper demonstrates that, contrary to 
Xepapadeas [ 10]. the budget balancing system of random penalties cannot be used induce compliance 
with the regulator's objectives if firms are risk neutral. However. the mechanism can be successfully 
applied if firms are sufficiently risk averse (Rasmusen [9]) . Second. the paper explores the optimal 
design of the random fine system. including the choice of fines. penalty probabilities. and team size. 
Budget Balancing Incentive Mechanisms 
The information requirements associated with many nonpoint source pollution control mecha· 
nisms represent a significant barrier to their practical implementation. It is typically not enough to 
measure the ambient concentration of a pollutant at a receptor site. One must also understand and 
monitor the stochastic fate and transport mechanisms that link sources of pollution to the receptor site 
of interest.' Titis information can be costly, potentially offsening the gains to society from the 
pollution control itself. In addition, traditional control devices, such as Pigouvian taxes and subsidies. 
require that each polluting agent incur the marginal damage associate with the regulatory agency's 
target level of pollution. The result is that these mechanisms are typically not "budget balancing," 
collecting a multiple of damage costs from firms as a whole when taxes are employed and requiring 
the regulatory agency to pay a multiple of the avoided damage costs to firms in the case of Pigouvian 
subsidies. 2 
Recent work by Xepapadeas [13] offers a promising approach to resolving both the monitoring 
and budget balancing problems. Drawing on the moral hazard literature for dealing with shirking 
within the firm (e.g .. Holmstrom [6], Rasmusen [II]), Xepapadeas develops a budget balancing 
incentive scheme that relies upon a combination of subsidies and random fines. A random fine is 
assessed against at least one polluter in the event that the regulator's pollution target is violated.'· 
Budget balancing is achieved by then returning this fme, minus the damages to society from non· 
compliance, to the remaining firms. The regulator need not observe the actual emissions or abatement 
efforts of the individual firms. Properly designed, this system of random fines induces firms to adopt 
the targeted level of abatement effort. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it demonstrates that, contrary to Xepapadeas [ 13], 
I 
the budget balancing system of subsidies and random penalties cannot be used induce compliance with 
the regulator's objectives if firms are risk neutral.' However, the mechanism can be successfully 
applied if firms are sufficiently risk averse (Rasmusen [I I]) . Second, the paper explores the optimal 
design of the random penalty mechanism. We show that the mechanism will be effective for a wider 
range of firms if program parameters are differentiated according to the firms' risk preferences. The 
paper also considers the optimal number of firms to include in the regulatory pool. 
2. THE BASIC MECHANISM 
The random penalty mechanism developed in Xepapadeas [ 13] represents an adaptation to the 
environmental arena of the budget balancing contracts developed in Rasmusen [I I]. Whereas [I I] is 
concerned with avoiding shirking among agents producing a shared output, the agents in [I3] share the 
gains to society from reductions in the ambient concentration of pollution. A key distinguishing 
feature between the two articles lies in Xepapadeas's assumption that the agents are risk neutral. This 
section reviews the system of subsidies and random penalties developed in Xepapadeas [ 13] and 
extends its application to the case in which firms are risk averse along the lines of Rasmusen [1 I]. 
The notation of [13] is followed with only minor modifications5 
2.1 N oration 
Consider an economy consisting of n firms (i=l, ... ,n) which in the course of their production 
processes contribute to the ambient concentration of pollution in a region. Pollution abatement effort 
is assumed to be costly. with the cost to the i"' firm determined by the function C;(A;), where A; 
denotes the level of the firm's abatement effort, C;(O) = 0. OC/dA; > 0, and <fC/<JA;2 > 0. In the 
absence of government intervention. the cost minimizing firm sets its abatement effort to zero and 
earns a profit of IT;'. The resulting ambient concentration is given by W0 = W(O), where W(A) is the 
single-valued function linldng the ambient concentration of pollution to the vector of firm abatement 
2 
3 
efforts A = (A,.A, ..... A,). Assume that oW/oA, :S 0. The regulatory agency's problem is to reduce this 
concentration to the socially optimal level of W = W(A), where A, denotes the optimal level of 
abatement effort by firm i. Xepapadeas [13] derives Wand A as the result of the social planner's 
maximization of an Arrow type [1] felicity function. The familiar first order conditions result, 
equating the marginal benefits and marginal costs of abatement effort. Formally, 
-NlW(A)/ilA, = oC, loA, 'V i=l, ... ,n, (1) 
where A. denotes the shadow cost of pollution concentration. 
2.2 Budget Balancing with Risk Neutrality 
Let 'I' = 'l'[W(A)] denote the welfare gains to society resulting from abatement effort A and 
the corresponding reduction in ambient concentration from W0 to W(A).6 Under Xepapadeas' [13] 
budget balancing contract B, if the target level of ambient concentration is met (i.e., W :S W), the 
regulator allocates the gains to society ('i' = 'l'(WJ) among the firms. Formally, firm i receives the 
• ... "' 7 
subsidy b, = $,'!', where 2::;$, = 1. 
In the event that the target concentration level is not met, one firm is randomly selected and 
penalized. The penalty has two components: (1) the firm loses its subsidy, b,, and (2) an additional 
fme, F,, is assessed against the firm.' In order to maintain the budget balancing nature of the contract, 
these penalties, minus the welfare loss to society due to the higher ambient concentration, are 
redistributed among the remaining firms. 
The random penalty mechanism can be summarized in terms of the firm's subsidy, b,, under 
the program: 
4 
b,(A) 
b = "'1' 
' o/' 
-F. 
' 
w~w 
W> W , with probability ~' (2) 
W> W , with probability ~1 , j * i 
where ~. E [0.1] denotes the probability that firm i is penalized (with L, ~' = 1), f(A) = 't'[W(A)] - .P 
denotes the change in social welfare from the level targeted by the regulator (with f[W(A)] < 0 for 
W(A) > W). and $,; = <1>/L..,tl>k denotes the share of firm j's penalty that is allocated to firm i. 
The contract in (2) establishes a noncooperative game among the firms sharing in the societal 
gains from pollution abatement. Firm i's total profit is conditioned on its own level of abatement 
effort, as well as the abatement effort put forth by the other firms, denoted A., = 
(A1, .. ., A,., ,A,.,, ... , A,). That is, 
H(A ,A .) = H 0 + b.(A) - C.(A) 
I I -i I I I I 
Iii=!, 2, ... n. (3) 
The question is whether the contract parameters can be designed so that there exists a Nash equilibri-
urn with each firm voluntarily choosing the targeted level of abatement effort and yielding the targeted 
ambient concentration. 
Following Xepapadeas [13] and Rasrnusen [II], assume that each firm treats the other firms as 
being in compliance (i.e., A.,= A.J Let A; e [O,A,) denote the im firm's optimal "cheating 
abatement leveL" Assuming firms are risk neutral, A;' is given by 
where 
A( = argmax E[H,(A,A.)l 
A,e[O,A) 
(4) 
5 
(5) 
denotes finn i's expected profits. The firm will choose the Pareto optimal abatement effort. A,. if 
cheating is on average less profitable than compliance. That is. if 9 
n, = E[ll,(A,". A)] - E[il,(.{, A)] 
= j: F + ~ ~ lb +"' .[b. + F + r(W)J} - b + [C(A) - C(A .)] (6) ~I I L...,#l ...,} I "(I) } } I I I I I 
< 0 \ii=i, .. .,n 
Xepapadeas [13, p. 123] notes that because" ... n, is a strictly decreasing function ofF,, there should 
exist a fine F, E (0,+~) such that O;CF;) < 0." While this statement is true, it is not sufficient to ensure 
that the required series of inequalities in (6) holds simultaneously. The problem is that, while 
increasing F, will decrease 0,, it will also increase 0; (i.e., oQjoF, > 0) and potentially encourage 
another finn to cheat. In fact, Holmstrom's [ 6, p. 326) Theorem I establishes that this cheating effect 
will dominate, so that A= A will not be a Nash equilibrium under contract B of Xepapadeas [13). 
Rewriting this theorem in the current notation, we have: 
THEOREM 1. Assuming risk neutral firms, there does not exist a set of fines, shares, and penalty 
probabilities (i.e., {F,,~,.~j) that will yield the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of A = A satisfying 
the inequality constraints in (6). 
PROOF: HolmstrOm [6], Theorem I. Whereas Holmstrom's agents share output from the production 
process (i.e., x(a)), agents in the current application share output from the abatement process plus the 
pool of exogenous fines (i.e., ['l'(A) + L;F;]). Holmstrom's private cost function, v;(a;). corresponds to 
the abatement cost function C,(A;). Fibnally, whereas HolmstrOm's theorem I applies for a general 
sharing rule, (sJx(a)Jl, the random penalty mechanism relies upon specific shares [b,(A) + FJ 
6 
Altering the parameters of the random penalty mechanism (i.e .. {F,.¢):;,}) simply represents different 
ways to alter the "size of the pie" (i.e., x(a)) and the sharing rule used (i.e., s{x(a)J). Theorem 1 of 
Holmstrom still applies. Q.E.D. 
2.3. Budget Balancing with Risk Aversion 
As noted by Rasmusen [11]. the limitation of optimal sharing rules when firms are risk neutral 
lies in the linearity of the agent's objective function with respect to money. Even with random 
penalties for shirking, a profit maximizing firm will equate the marginal benefits from shirking and the 
expected marginal penalty. Pareto optimality requires that this expected marginal penalty equal the 
marginal damage of pollution concentration for each firm (equation (1)). The budget balancing 
restriction, however. prohibits this. since the marginal damage to society must be shared. The insight 
of Rasmusen [II] is that random penalties, when agents are sufficiently risk averse, can provide the 
extra "kick" to each agent's share of the marginal damage that is needed to insure compliance. The 
addition of risk to the firm's returns can be used to leverage what is otherwise an insufficient incentive 
to comply. Conceptually, the firm can comply and receive a certain return or cheat and be forced to 
participate in a lottery. The greater the firm's risk aversion. the more they will wish to comply, 
thereby avoiding the lottery. 
Risk aversion is incorporated into the analysis by assuming firms maximize the expected utility 
received from their profits, where utility is represented by the function U,(IT,) with U' > 0 and U" < 0. 
The finn's cheating abatement level, A,', is then determined by 
where 
A,' = argmax E{U[IT,(A,A_)J} 
A,E[O,ti.) 
(7) 
7 
E[fl,(A,.A)l= I;,U[r(' - C,(A) - F, ] 
(8) 
+ Ll", s, {U[r(' - C,(A) + b, + ¢ }b, + F, + r(W)}J} 
As in Rasmusen [II], we assume agents exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, providing a convenient 
parameterization of risk preferences. 10 In particular, U,(TI;) is given by 
U,(TI) = -exp( -e,n) 
where e, = -U"(U' > 0 measures the agent's constant absolute risk aversion. 
With risk averse firms, the system of subsidies and random penalties in (2) will yield the 
Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium if 
n, = E{U[TI,(A(. A)Jl - E{U[TI,<A,. A)Jl 
= -s,exp{--e,[r(' - C,(A() - F, J} 
-" l;.exp{--B.[r(' - C(A() + b + ¢ .l.b + F + r(W)}J} Lp, J I I I '} 1 } 
+ exp{--B,[r(' - C,(A,) + 6, J} 
< 0 Vi= 1,. . ., n 
(9) 
(10) 
Rasmusen's [11, p. 431] Proposition 2 can be written in the current context as the following theorem. 
THEOREM 2. Asswning risk averse firms, then for any set of positive fines and penalty probabilities 
(i.e., {F,,I;, I F, > 0 and<;,> 0 } ) there exists at least one sharing rule {¢J such that the Pareto 
optimal level of abatement effort, A = A, is also a Nash equilibrium satisfying the inequality con-
straints in (10) provided (a) firms are sufficiently risk averse (i.e., e, is large enough for all i) or (b) 
the fines are set high enough for all firms (i.e., F, is large enough for all i) . 
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PROOF: The proof of part (a) parallels Rasmusen [11. p. 431] and proceeds in two steps. First. we 
establish that there exists at least one sharing rule ( ¢,} such that: 
b, - C,(A) + C,(A, ') <: 0 'Vi~l. .... n (11) 
This inequality follows through a proof by contradiction. Suppose that a sharing rule satisfying the 
inequalities in (11) cannot be found, then b, - C,(A;) < -C(A:) < 0. Summing this inequality over all i 
yields -¥< :E,C(A,): i.e., the total costs of optimal pollution abatement exceed the social benefits 
received from that level of abatement effort. This contradicts the Pareto optimality of abatement effort 
A. Therefore. there exists at least one sharing rule satisfying equation (10). 
The second step in the proof requires establishing that n, is negative for a sufficiently large a,. 
Rewriting equation (I 0) yields: 
n ~ [ 3 .exp(aF) - " ~ exp{-e (b. + "'.fb. + F + r(W)}J} + exp( -a { 6. - C(A) + C (A,')})] 
' ~~ I I Lp., ...,} I I 't'y 1 1 I I I I I 
·exp( -e,{.r(' - C;(A(J}) (12) 
The last term, outside of the square brackets, is strictly positive. As a, increases, the second and third 
terms inside the square brackets go to zero if the sharing rule satisfies the inequality constraint in · 
equation (11). However, the first term has a positive exponent and goes to negative infinity as a, 
increases. Therefore. !:1, < 0 for a, sufficiently large. Q.E.D. 
The proof of Part (b) of Theorem 2 is left to the appendix. Intuitively, the simultaneous 
increase in the fines for all finns encourages compliance by increasing the variability of firms' 
cheating returns. As long as firms are risk averse, this increased variability eventually provides 
enough disutility to lead firms into compliance. A potential problem with employing larger and larger 
9 
fmes to insure compliance is that firms may begin to face liquidity constraints, effectively creating an 
upper bound on F,. 
Theorem 2 deviates from Rasmusen' s [ 11] Proposition 2 in two respects. First. Theorem 2 
identifies minimum shares that must be allocated to an individual agent. Specifically, the shares must 
satisfy 
6, > C.(A) - C;(A() Vi= I, ... , n. (13) 
That is, each agent must be allocated enough of the social gains from optimal abatement to offset the 
cost savings from cheating. This condition is not contained in [I I] because Rasmusen assumed that 
the agent's utility function was separable in money and effort. 11 This eliminates the interaction 
between e, and [C,(A,) - C;(A()]. Second, the proof of Theorem 2b corrects an oversight in 
Rasmusen's proof of Proposition 2(b). Rasmusen's [I I] argument in the current application would 
correspond to noting that n, is strictly decreasing in F; (i.e .. ilnjilF; < 0). Increasing F, will indeed 
decrease the first term in the square brackets of equation (12). Unfortunately, this proof has the same 
incentive problem as in the previous section. While increasing the fine to firm i can be used to induce 
compliance of that firm, it will, at the same time, encourage other firms to cheat (iln,JilF; > 0). 
However, as shown in the appendix. simultaneous increases in all of the fmes can induce compliance 
by increasing the variability of the firm's returns under cheating. 
3. EXTENSIONS 
Theorem 2 insures that a budget balancing system of subsidies and random penalties can be 
used to encourage compliance with the socially optimal abatement objectives if firms are sufficiently 
risk averse. But the theorem itself provides no guidance in terms of mechanism design. Rasmusen 
[I I] and Xepapadeas [I 3] are similarly quiet on the choice of program parameters. For example, 
10 
agents are given an equal probability of being penalized (i.e.,:;,= 1/n) in [ll]. despite varying levels 
of compliance costs and risk preferences. While the penalty probabilities are allowed to vary in [13]. 
the author does not explore how they should be assigned to individual firms. This section extends the 
balanced budget incentive mechanism in two directions. First, we consider how program parameters 
should be differentiated among agents with different risk preferences and abatement cost characteris-
tics. Second, we detail how the number of firms in the regulatory pool impacts program efficacy. 
3.1 Risk Preferences and Program Design 
Risk aversion is key to achieving compliance in the random penalty scheme detailed above. It 
is, therefore. natural to explore how the incentive mechanism's efficacy can be improved by targeting 
the program parameters according to the risk preferences of individual firms. In order to simplify the 
exposition. consider a world with two types of firms distinguished only in terms of their risk aversion. 
Specifically, nH firms are designated as highly risk averse firms. with a risk aversion coefficient 8" > 
0. The remaining nL = n - nH firms have a lower level of risk aversion, with 0 < eL < 8". In all 
other regards firms are assumed to be identical, with C;(A;) = C(A;). A,= A. and m = 11" 'V i= 1' .... n. 
Let :;•. F', and ¢'denote the penalty probabilities, fmes, and compliance shares allocated to 
individual firms within group g (g = H.L). Initially, assume that the regulator treats the two groups 
identically, with s' = :;, F' = F, and ¢' = ¢. The question is how compliance can be improved by 
moving away from this set of symmetric program parameters. We focus here on changes in the 
penalty probabilities. We show that compliance with the regulator's objective can be improved by 
shifting the penalty probability towards less risk averse firms and away from high risk averse firms. 
Intuitively, the highly risk averse firms need to face a relatively small chance of being penalized in 
order to insure that they will choose compliance. Reducing their penalty probability (SH) allows us to 
increase sL for the low risk aversion firms, who focus more on expected returns and less on the 
variability of returns. 
11 
To see this result, first consider the impact that a change in the penalty probability has on a 
firm's compliance. One would expect that an increase in the probability of being penalized would 
push firms towards compliance. This is in fact the case. Let Q' denote the value of n, for firms in 
group g. Using ( 10), we have: 
0 8 = - ~'exp{-9,[1'1' - C(A,) - F J} 
-C1-s•)exp{-9,[I1'- C(A;) + 6 + (b + F + r(W)l/(n-1)Jl (14) 
+ expf-e [I1' - C(A) + 6 J} g g 'V g =H,L. 
Taking the derivative of Q' with respect to ~· yields: 
il08/il~ 8 = -expf-e,[I1' - C(A;) - F J} 
+ exp{-9 [I1' - C(A ") + 6 + (b + F + f(W)l/(n-l)]l g g (15) 
< 0 'Vg=HL. 
Since the right-hand side of equation (15) is independent of~·. we also have il'O'/(fJ~')2 = 0. This 
suggests that, if only one of the two groups is noncompliant, increasing the penalty probability for the 
noncompliant group will push them in the desired direction. 12 
The next step is to establish the likely identity of this noncompliant group. Intuitively, one 
would expect compliance to increase with risk aversion. The random penalty scheme offers firms the 
choice between a certain outcome (with compliance) and a lottery (when cheating has occurred). If 
firms with low risk aversion have chosen to comply and avoid the "cheating" lottery, one would 
expect firms with a higher level of risk aversion to do the same. The reverse need not be true. 
Theorem 3 formalizes this intuition. 
12 
THEOREM 3: Let O(e.<;.F.~! represel!lthe value of Ofor a given set of program parameters and 
level of firm risk aversion. Then (a) 0!8'-;i;,F.~) S 0 => 0(8H;s.F.~) < 0 for 8'- <~and (b) there 
exists a unique e· such that O(e";I;.F.<\>!=0. 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
Note that Theorem 3 does not establish that an;ae < 0. This need not be the case. For example. 
Figure I illustrates the shape of 0(8) for the negative exponential utility function. e· merely 
establishes the boundary between non-compliance and compliance. 
Theorem 3 can be used to establish the basic conclusion of this subsection: i.e .. that non-
compliance with the regulator's optimal abatement objective can be reduced by shifting the penalty 
probability towards firms with lower levels of risk aversion. Consider any two risk aversion coeffi-
cients, with e" > er- > 0. Four potential compliance scenarios can arise when SH = sL: 
• Case I: OH < 0 and oL < 0 (Complete Compliance). In this situation. no changes in the 
penalty probabilities are required to achieve compliance. 
• Case 2: o" <! 0 and oL <! 0 (Complete Noncompliance). In this situations. no changes 
in the penalty probabilities can be made to achieve compliance. Both risk aversion groups 
require increases in 1;. buts" and SL are constrained by the relationship: n~H + nLsL 
=1. 
• Case 3: o" <! 0 and oL < 0. Theorem 3 rules out this alternative. 
• Case 4: o" < 0 and OL <! 0. In this case. compliance may be achieved by shifting some 
of the penalty probability towards the low risk aversion firms. If this shift is small enough 
(i.e., so as not to induce noncompliance on the part of the high risk aversion firms), then 
the budget balancing incentive mechanism may be successfully applied. 
Figure 2a illustrates the potential gains for a two-firm example. With I;L = I;H = .5, only the 
highly risk averse firm is in compliance (i.e., n" < 0 and n" > 0). A reduction in I;" to within the 
range of (1;".1;"), with the corresponding increase in i;L, moves the low risk aversion firm into 
compliance (d- < 0), while maintairting compliance for the high risk aversion firm. However, if the 
!:1(8) 
8' 0~-~-----------------------------~ 
Figure 1. Compliance Curve for the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion Model 
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overall level of risk aversion is not high enough. the shift in probabilities will be unsuccessful. as 
illustrated in Figure 2b. 
3.2 Team Size 
The results of the previous subsection illustrate how the regulator can enhance compliance by 
exploiting the diversity of finns within the targeted group. Another tool available to the regulator is 
the choice of how many finns to group together in applying the random penalty mechanism. For 
example, in its efforts to control the use of agricultural chemicals, the regulator can choose to treat all 
fanns within a region as a single group or to divide them into several "teams." The advantage of the 
single team approach is that it requires the monitoring of a single emissions or concentration threshold 
for the region. Subdividing the region requires the establishment and monitoring of additional 
thresholds and, hence. entails additional information costs.13 On the other hand. including a large 
number of finns on a single regulatory team may adversely affect the random penalty incentive. A 
firm's chances of being penalized for noncompliance decrease as the number of finns on the team 
increases. This subsection detennines the impact of team size on compliance. 
In order to simplify the exposition, consider an economy with n identical finns. With ~' = 
1/n, F, = F, and <j>, = <j>, the compliance conditions of equation ( 10) reduce to: 
n = - (1/n)exp{-8[11' - C(A ') - F J} 
-[(n-1)/n]exp{-8[11'- C(A ') + 6 + fb + F + r(W)}f(n-l)J} 
+ exp{ -8[11' - C(A) + 6 J} 
< 0. 
(16) 
The impact of team size on compliance can be seen by differentiating ( 16) with respect to n yielding: 
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iJO!iJn = (1/n 2)[exp{-8[r1' - C(A ') - F J} - exp{-e[rl' - C(A ') + b + (£, + F + l(W)}/(n-l)J}] 
+ {-e[b + F + f(W)]/[n(n-l)]l exp{_:8[r1' - C(A ') + b + (£, + F + f(W)l/(n-1)]}] (17) 
The two lines of equation (17) reflect the two competing effects that result from a change inn. The 
first line is strictly positive and reflects the fact that an increase inn decreases the firm's probability of 
being penalized. Tltis encourages the firm to cheat (i.e., increases Q). Offsetting this effect is the fact 
that. when the firm cheats and is not caught. a larger n means that the firm must share the penalty 
(i.e .. b + F + f(W)) with more agents. Tltis reduces the incentive to cheat (i.e .. decreases Q), as 
reflected in the strictly negative term on line two of equation (17). However, it is the first effect that 
dominates, yielding the following theorem. 
THEOREM 4: Compliance is a strictly decreasing function of team size (i.e., iJD.IiJn > 0). 
PROOF: Factoring iJn;iJn into two terms, equation (17) can be rewrinen as 
an;an = p cr (18) 
where 
p = n ·'exp{-8[!1' - C(A ') + b + (£, + F + f(W)l/(n-l)]l (19) 
and 
cr = exp{8[b + F + (£, + F + r(W)}/(n-l)]l - I - 8[b + F + f(W)][n/(n-1)] <20) 
Since p > 0. it is the sign of cr that determines the sign of iJQ/iJn. Using the fact that f(W) < 0, 
equation (20) implies 
17 
cr > exp{S[b + F + f(W) + fb + F + f(W)}/(n-l)}l - I - 9[/.i + F + f(W)][n/(n-1)} 
= exp{S[b + F + f(W)}[n/(n-1)]} - I - S[b + F + f(W)][n/(n-1)} 
= g(S[b + F + f(W)}[n/(n-1)}) 
(21) 
where g(x) = exp(x) - 1 - x. Since g(O) = 0 and g'(x) = exp(x) - I > 0 for x > 0, then g(x) > 0 for x 
> 0. With Sfb+ F + r}n/(n-1) > 0, it immediately follows from equation (21) that cr > 0. which in 
tum implies that ()rl,l()n > 0. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 4 suggests that, from the perspective of compliance, it is desirable for the regulator to 
keep the number of team members as small as possible. This must be weighed against the additional 
monitoring costs associated with having numerous small teams, as well as the additional potential for 
collusion. Large teams may still be effectively controlled, provided that risk aversion within the team 
is large enough or that the regulator has set large enough fines to offset the negative effects of team 
size. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The combination of subsidies and random penalties. originally proposed in Rasmusen [II] and 
adapted to the environmental arena by Xepapadeas [13}, provides a potentially promising alternative t9 
more traditional approaches to pollution control. By eliminating the need for firm level monitoring of 
emissions or abatement effort, the mechanism can significantly lower the regulator's administration 
costs. In addition, the budget balancing aspect of the control device eliminates the need for the 
regulator to contribute incentives to the firms, beyond the welfare gains generated by abatement. In an 
era of significant budgetary constraints, this feature of the random penalty mechanism is particularly 
appealing. 
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There are, however, limits to the use of random penalties. Contrary to the original claim in 
Xepapadeas [13]. random penalties cannot be used to achieve compliance if firms are risk neutral. 
Budget balancing still requires that each firm pay, on average, only a fraction of the damages 
associated with pollution emissions. This will not be enough to offset the cost savings that they fully 
capture by shirldng.14 However, if firms are risk averse. Theorem 2 demonstrates that the introduction 
of random penalties can be used to leverage each firm's portion of the marginal damages and achieve 
compliance with the regulator's objective. If risk aversion among the firms is small, increasing the 
level of fines for all firms can be used to insure compliance, as long as liquidity constraints are not 
binding. 
The random penalty mechanism may face a second problem in both the political and legal 
arenas due to the random assignment of the penalty in the event of shirking. Firms that consistently 
comply with their assigned abatement objective can still be penalized. This may make random 
penalties difficult to legislate and to uphold in a court of law. 
Finally, this paper has extended the research into random penalties by considering ways in 
which the regulator can improve compliance by targeting program parameters according to the risk 
preferences of individual firms and by choosing the optimal team size. One limitation of using risk 
preferences to target program characteristics is that information on risk attitudes may itself be costly to 
acquire. potentially offsetting the reduced monitoring costs associated with the random penalty 
approach. An area of future research is to consider alternative targeting criteria, such as the size or 
abatement cost structure of the firms. 
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5. APPENDIX 
5.1 Proof of Theorem 2(b) 
Consider a set of fines. where F; = a;F. The compliance variable 0; in equation (10) becomes: 
0 = - ~ exp{-9 [.,o - C (A,') - aF J} 
I 1.:1, I l.lj I I 
-" ~ exp{-9[.,o- C(A") + b + "{b + aF + f(W)}J} L...Jp1 0..,J ,lij 1 I 1 'f't}} J (22) 
+ exp{ -9.[rf! - C,(A,) + b; J} 
Differentiating (2; with respect to F yields: 
oO,foF = - 9,a,C,,exp{-9.[rf! - C,(A;") - a,F J} 
+" 9aC,.tj) .. exp{-9[rf! - C.(A;") + b + ¢ .rb. + aF + f(W)}J} Lp, I J J I) I I I '} 1 J J 
< -9,a,C,,[exp{-9Jrf! - C;(A;) - a,F J} (23) 
- " a.C, tj) .. exp{-9[rf! - C(A;") - aF J}] Lp,JJIJ I I I 
= -9exp{-9[.,o- C.(A,)- aF J}[a~ -" (aC,<t> 1]. 
I I llj I I ,,, Lp, J ) ij/ 
The regulator can choose the a;' s to solve the system of n equations: 
i = 1, ...• n (24) 
The second derivative of 0; with respect to F yields: 
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(J'O.,J(JF' = - (9p,)'~,exp{-S,[r(' - C,(A() - a,F J} 
- "· (ea.(j>.)'~.exp{-S[r('- C(A() + fj + (j>(b + aF + f(W)}J} <25l 
L,FtlfiJI I I I 1)/) 
< 0. 
Equations (23) and (25) insure that, for a sufficiently large F, 0., < 0 '1 i. Q.E.D. 
5.2 Proof of Theorem 3 
Let 0.,(9) = 0.,(9;~.F.$) denote the value of n, for a given set of program parameters and level 
of finn risk aversion. Furthennore, let R;(9) denotes the risk premiwn that finn i associates with the 
cheating solution. That is, R;(9) is defined implicitly by: 
UiE[TI,(A(,A_,)] - R,(9)l = E{U[TI,(A(,A_)]l . (26) 
Theorem I of Pratt [9, p. 128] establishes that this risk premiwn is monotonically increasing with risk 
aversion; i.e., (JR;(8)/(J9 > 0. Using R;(9), 0.,(9) in equation (14) can be rewritten as: 
(27) 
The tenn {E[TI,( A;,A_.)] - R,(9)}denotes the certainty equivalent profit of the cheating option. as 
perceived by a finn with a risk aversion coefficient of e. 
Now consider two risk aversion levels a" and &', with eL < eH and 0.,(9") ~ 0. Since U is a 
monotonically increasing function, 0.,(9") ~ 0 implies that 
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(28) 
With <lR;(S)!<lS > 0. this in tum implies that 
(29) 
Again using the fact that U is a strictly increasing function. equation (29) implies 
(30) 
The second half of Theorem 3 follows immediately from combining Theorems I. 2. and 3(a). 
From Theorem I we have n;(O) > 0. Theorem 2 establishes that Q;(S) < 0 for e sufficiently large. 
Since n, is a continuous function of e. there therefore exists at least one e· such that n,ce') = 0. The 
fact that e· is unique follows from the first half of Theorem 3, since n,ce') = 0 implies that Q;(S) < 0 
for all e > e·. Q.E.D. 
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6. FOOTNOTES 
I. See Cabe and Herriges [ 4]. 
2. Xepapadeas [13. p. 114] defines budget balancing incentive mechanisms in the environmental arena 
as contracts that allocate ·· ... to the members of the discharges' group the total amount of subsidy that 
corresponds to any given deviation between desired and 'measured' ambient concentration levels." 
3. Related research on dealing with moral hazard in the multiple agent setting includes Baiman and 
Demsld [3], Lazear and Rosen [7], Radner [10], Atldnson and Feltham [2], Green and Stokey [5], and 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz [8]. 
4. This result was demonstrated earlier by Holmstrom [6]. 
5. In particular, whereas Xepapadeas [13] considers the application of the random penalty mechanism 
over time, we restrict our attention to a single time period. Extending the results below to multiple 
time periods is straightforward. 
6. 'l'[W(A)] corresponds to the residual social valuation of optimal abatement, RSB, in Xepapadeas 
[ 13]. 
7. In Xepapadeas [13], the i"' firm's share in the gains to society, cj),, is set equal to its share of the 
total targeted abatement level: i.e., <j>, = A, fi.,Ar 
8. It is important to note that the firm selected need not be the source of the excess pollution. As a 
result, the firm's actual abatement effort need not be monitored. 
9. As noted in Xepapadeas (13], the Nash equilibrium of the game may change if the firms do not 
assume that their counterparts are in compliance (i.e .• A.; = A.J 
10. Much of the analysis below does not depend upon this specification. However. some of the 
results, specifically those stated in Theorems 2 and 3, use the convenient parameterization of risk in 
their proofs. 
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11. The subsidy specification in Xepapadeas [13], witb ¢,=A, !I./\,. need not satisfy tbe restriction 
in (13). 
12. A similar argument can be made in terms of changes in tbe fine, P. since increases in tbe fine 
will also encourage compliance (i.e., iln'/ilP < 0). 
13. Collusion is an additional problem that is likely to increase as the number of firms on a "team" 
shrinks. 
14. Of course, if budget balancing is not strictly required, tben the random penalty may be effective. 
However, tbe basic point of this paper remains. If tbe government has limited resources available to 
provide incentives for pollution abatement, the random penalty mechanism provides a way of 
leveraging tbose resources, but only for firms who are risk averse. 
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